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DECENTRALIZATION, PRO-POOR LAND POLICIES, AND 
DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE  
Ruth Meinzen-Dick,
1 Monica Di Gregorio, and Stephan Dohrn 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Decentralized approaches to development are gaining increasing prominence. Land 
tenure reform policy has been affected by many different types of decentralization. 
However, the literature on land tenure reform rarely explicitly addressed the 
implications of decentralization, and vice versa. This paper provides a review of how 
the issues of decentralization are linked to land tenure reform, in theory and 
practice.  
Both decentralization and land tenure reform each encompass a number of 
different, but related concepts and approaches. We begin with clarifying some key 
terms related to these different approaches, then look in more detail at contending 
perspectives on decentralization, and how these relate to the United Nations 
Development Programme’s (UNDP) pillars of democratic governance. We then 
review the different types of land tenure reform in terms of the role of centralized 
and decentralized institutions, illustrating the strengths and weaknesses, gaps and 
challenges with experience from a range of developing countries. The final section 
turns to conclusions and policy recommendations, considering how decentralized 
approaches to land tenure reform can contribute to goals such as gender equity, 
social cohesion, human rights, and the identity of indigenous peoples. 
Types of Decentralization 
Decentralization is often part of a number of related policy reforms, in which central 
government agencies transfer rights and responsibilities to more localized 
institutions.
2 Three broad types of decentralization can be identified, depending on 
the particular functions being transferred from central government authorities. 
Administrative decentralization transfers responsibility for administrative 
procedures; political decentralization delegates electoral and legislative authority to 
the periphery; financial decentralization transfers both resources and responsibility 
for financing government services to local entities. 
It is also critical to distinguish among the reforms that are referred to as 
decentralization according to the type of institution to which authority or functions 
are devolved. Is it more local offices of government line agencies, or local 
government bodies, or user groups? Each of these will have different types of 
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accountability and incentive structures, which will influence the outcome of the 
reforms. 
As diverse as these approaches are, they share a common theme of bringing 
the functions of the state closer to the people, literally and/or figuratively. They 
thereby have the potential to contribute to the UNDP pillars of democratic 
governance: responsive state institutions, inclusive citizens’ participation, as well as 
values and principles that are rights-based, gender sensitive, and advocate for 
social cohesion. However, the extent to which they fulfill these goals in practice 
varies enormously, as discussed below. 
Types of Land Tenure Reform Policy 
Although the term “land reform” is still associated with redistribution of land, there 
are many types of land tenure reform or land policy. In this brief we deal primarily 
with four broad categories: 
•  Registration of existing rights to land, ranging from relatively simple 
registration procedures to full cadastral surveys and titling. 
•  Redistribution, including state or market led land reform to achieve more 
equitable distribution. 
•  Restitution, rectifying past injustices by reinstating rights or providing 
alternative land where original landholders were evicted by war, conquest, 
forced collectivization, or other expropriation deemed unjust. 
•  Recognition of rights that are currently being exercised by individuals or 
groups, but have not previously been sanctioned by the state. 
Each of these categories involves some form of administration, allocation of 
rights, enforcement, and conflict mediation and resolution. Although they are 
conceptually distinct, a particular case may involve a combination of these.
3 
2. UNDERSTANDING DECENTRALIZATION 
Decentralization has been on the development agenda for a long time, with shifts 
between centralization and decentralization registered in most countries. The first 
wave of decentralization during the 1950s-60s focused on deconcentration and 
strengthening of local government, often in countries still under colonial rule. At 
this time most programs to foster decentralization focused on public administration 
measures to determine the best way to delegate administrative functions of the 
central state to local state agencies, as a means to increase efficiency of 
government functions including containing central expenditures. 
A second wave occurred in the 1970-80s when newly independent 
governments, established on centralized principles, gained renewed interest in 
decentralization. Case studies concentrated in countries engaged in decentralization 
programs, particularly where donor driven projects were underway. During this 
period decentralization was seen as a means for goals of participation, rural 
development, and the maintenance of national unity (Conyers, 1983). 
                                                      
 




In the 1990s the so-called “third wave” of democratization added the crafting 
of democratic institutions at the local level as a component of new decentralization 
projects. The democratic component of these projects focused on fostering 
participation and accountability, as vehicles to increase empowerment, equitable 
benefit sharing and thus reduce poverty. Introduction of direct election at the local 
level and increased local legislative powers vis-à-vis the executive and the 
bureaucratic apparatus were seen as vehicle to strengthen people’s participation. 
The 1990s were also marked by a number of devolution programs in natural 
resource management that sought to “roll back the boundaries of the state,” in 
particular by retransferring control over natural resources to user groups (Vedeld, 
1996). Like many delegation and political decentralization programs, one impetus 
for devolution programs was recognition of the limitations of state capacity to 
manage natural resources. Objectives of such programs were usually a mix of: 
reducing the fiscal costs of the state, improving resource management by tapping 
into users’ greater local knowledge of the resource, and empowering local resource 
users (Meinzen-Dick and Knox, 2001). These programs were found regarding both 
aquatic (fisheries and irrigation) and land-based resources, notably forestry and 
rangelands. 
Types of Decentralization 
One useful way of sorting through the various types of reform that are sometimes 
referred to as “decentralization” is to examine the accountability structures of each, 
as illustrated in Figure 1. While particular programs may combine these in different 
combinations, in practice several broad patterns can be discerned:
4 
•  Deconcentration or delegation refers to administrative decentralization in 
which functions are transferred to lower-level units of a government 
agency. This represents the least fundamental change, because authority 
remains with the same type of institution, and accountability is ultimately 
still upward to the central government (which is sometimes taken to 
represent society at large, but the mechanisms are quite indirect). 
•  Political decentralization transfers authority and functions to local 
government. Where local government is elected, such reforms are 
referred to as democratic decentralization, and may be assumed to be 
responsible to the entire local populace, However, for this to hold in 
practice requires effective local democratic representation and 
accountability of local authorities to the local populace, in other words, 
substantive democracy-volution to user groups at the local level creates 
accountability to their membership, usually those who depend on the 
resource, but these members do not necessarily represent others in the 
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local community, nor society at large. The extent to which these groups 
(like local governments) are, in practice, accountable to their members or 
are dominated by the elites will depend on the degree of checks and 
balances within these groups, and their adherence to democratic decision-
making. 
•  Privatization reforms are also related to “rolling back the boundaries of 
the state.” But whereas the other reforms transfer authority to some 
other form of public body, privatization transfers authority and 
responsibility to private groups or individuals. It therefore has the least 
accountability to the public at large. If the transfers are to firms, they are 
accountable only to their shareholders (who may not even live in the 
country); even if the transfers are to non-profit service organizations such 
as grassroots or external nongovernmental organizations (NGO), they are 
accountable to their donors. 
Figure 1: Types of decentralization reforms 
 
 





Behind all these trends is the broad principle of subsidiarity, meaning that 
decision making should be devolved to the lowest appropriate level.
5 Within this, 
transfers of authority to lower levels of government (deconcentration and 
decentralization) represent vertical subsidiarity, while transfers to non-
governmental institutions (user groups or private firms) represents a horizontal 
dimension of subsidiarity (Döring, 1997). 
Decentralization Outcomes  
In each case, the stated intention is usually to reduce the geographic or social 
distance between the governance structure and the people affected. But the extent 
to which this is achieved varies. Effective decentralization requires detailed 
knowledge of local conditions and institutions and a nuanced understanding of the 
impact of the process of decentralization itself (Di Gregorio et al., forthcoming; 
Litvack et al., 1998). 
“Instilling democracy” from the top or from external actors is likely to work 
only where the preconditions for substantive democracy are in place, with strong 
civil society or customary mechanisms for check and balances. The Brazil 
experience shows that “although decentralization fosters democracy, there are 
many political and economic factors influencing its outcomes, exposing the many 
limits of decentralization: the limits of financial decentralization in countries 
affected by regional inequalities, the limits of political decentralization when old 
political coalitions live on, the limits of decentralization on policy results when there 
is a lack of social consensus on what is to be achieved by decentralization. These 
limits help to understand why decentralization has generally promised more than it 
has delivered, both in the political system and in policy results, emphasizing that 
decentralization in not the panacea promised by its advocates, and that its results 
are influenced by political and economic factors” (Souza, 1996:551). 
Two factors are particularly important in shaping the outcomes of 
decentralization reforms: the technical capacity of the body ultimately delivering 
various services and regulation, and the degree of economic and social inequality. 
Many types of decentralization programs have been implemented in response 
to the limited capacity of government agencies to provide adequate services, 
particularly in remote rural areas. But if local bodies do not have the human and 
financial resources to do the job, they will do no better. Creating new institutions at 
the local level is also costly, both in time and resources. For this reason many 
devolution programs, in particular, have sought to use existing customary 
institutions for service delivery and some specific government functions. In many 
countries, for example, the judicial role is delegated, sometimes informally, to local 
customary leadership. With regard to land tenure in Africa, for example, local chiefs 
often seem a logical starting point, particularly where government bodies have 
been shown to be inadequate and customary authorities are strong, as in areas of 
Ghana (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001). But this might be problematic if these 
authorities are patriarchal, biased against certain sub-groups, and lack clear 
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accountability mechanisms to local constituencies (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Ribot, 
2004; Ntsebaza, 1999; Manor, 1999). 
Decentralization and Local Accountability 
If there are strong social or economic differences at the local level, or if local 
authorities are not accountable to local people, decentralization can contribute to 
elite capture, to the exclusion of the landless, poor or marginalized social groups 
such as low-caste or indigenous people, and women (Edmunds and Wollenberg, 
2003). Local power elites, particularly powerful landowners, may even block critical 
reforms to address poverty. 
Furthermore, decentralization efforts are often posited as reforms to 
strengthen the involvement of local people, referred to as “community 
participation,” with an assumption that this will tap into stronger local institutions 
for appropriate resource management and give greater voice to the poor. But 
although reference to “communities” conjures up images of solidarity, in fact many 
local groups are very heterogeneous, with patriarchal or other inegalitarian 
institutions (Agrawal and Gibson, 2001; Kepe, 1999). In addition, in heterogeneous 
communities, decentralization can reduce the accountability of local governments to 
the interests of the marginalized, while the central government may provide more 
consideration for their interests. There are thus no uniform conclusions about which 
levels of government are most susceptible to special interest capture; rather, it 
depends on poverty levels and the strength of different political institutions (Di 
Gregorio et al., forthcoming). 
The decentralized institutions do not operate in a vacuum. In particular, the 
central state continues to play a critical role, and civil society can play an important 
role in demanding democracy and pro-poor policies. Thus, the redefinition of links 
between central and local government and civil society is critical. Rather than one 
ideal type of institution, what is critical is to develop polycentric governance in 
which a range of central and local institutions, public and private, each play a role 
(Ostrom, 1999; Wunsch, 1999). 
These issues are particularly relevant to land tenure reform, particularly as 
there is renewed attention to land issues to address poverty and legal 
empowerment of the poor. A fairly high degree of technical competence is needed 
to identify and adjudicate property rights, develop cost-effective mechanisms of 
land valuation, land taxation, make records, and settle disputes. Enabling people 
who have acquired stronger land rights to use them effectively for poverty 
reduction may require even further capacity development. For example, even with 
a strong constitutional mandate to redress inequalities, the impact of South Africa’s 
land reforms has been limited by the training, finances, and development support 
needed to transform rural relations among people affected by unemployment, land 
scarcity, and weak local organizations. This is especially the case where new 
arrangements call for communities to take on responsibilities for autonomous 
management that include registration, policing, and other duties that require high 
costs and capabilities (James, 2007; Wisborg and Rohde, 2005). 
As in the case of devolution of natural resource management mentioned 
above, fair execution of these tasks for land tenure reform also requires the 
articulation of local with external, technical, and management knowledge. 




the technical capacity, or is not subject to elite capture. But because land is such a 
critical resource and still the basis for power differences, especially in rural areas, 
landlords and other local elites may block land tenure reform, or use it to secure 
rights for themselves unless there are strong countervailing pressures.  
Furthermore, where decentralization also involves fiscal decentralization 
policies whereby local governments become responsible for their own revenues, 
land can become an important source of revenue for the local authorities as well. 
With decentralization, the central government reduces services, and if local units 
are to provide critical services (for land administration as well as for other functions 
such as education, health, or policing), they need revenue. Local property tax is a 
relatively predictable revenue stream, and easy to administer (FAO 2004), but this 
dependence on the rural tax base will affect the tenure reform process. In 
Indonesia, indigenous ethnic minorities anticipated that they would receive stronger 
land rights as a consequence of decentralization and regional autonomy policies 
that transferred responsibility and authority over resource extraction and local 
governance, from the central government to district authorities by participation in 
local-level politics. However, because the same laws give district level governments 
a percentage of revenues from natural resource exploitation, the local governments 
had incentive to disregard minority land rights in efforts to raise income to cover 
their new expenses (Duncan 2007). The combination of raised expectations and 
lack of clear procedures for implementing decentralization and addressing disputes 
contributed to increased violence (Peluso 2007). Similar problems over revenues 
from land have been identified in China, where local governments have 
expropriated farmers’ lands to provide to industries to relocate, thereby reducing 
local land tenure security to increase local government revenues (Zhang, 2006; 
2007). 
In practice, many countries adopt a combination of approaches to 
decentralization in different sectors, and may fluctuate between decentralization 
and recentralization policies (Banana et al., 2007; Ribot et al., 2006). Nor is 
decentralization always associated with democracy. There are numerous examples 
of autocratic decentralization (Eaton, 2006) as well as recentralization occurring 
under democratic rule, or in order to reduce elite capture and local authoritarian 
enclaves (Montero and Samuels, 2004). To identify pro-poor policies, development 
planners should take into account both national and local political conditions before 
suggesting specific decentralization policies. The exact interactions between 
decentralization and outcomes depend on local conditions and the types of reform, 
as discussed in the following section.  
3. LAND TENURE REFORM, DECENTRALIZATION, AND DEMOCRACY 
Certain land governance functions are needed for all land tenure reform: some form 
of land administration is needed to allocate rights or determine who should hold 
them for each resource unit, and to record the rights in some form. There is a 
continuing need for enforcement of the rights and conflict mediation and resolution. 
The exact arrangements for these can vary, from a single centralized state 




as chiefs or elders, newly formed user groups, or even service providers from the 
private sector or NGOs,
6 and combinations of these different institutions. 
Table 1: Comparison of different forms of land tenure reform 
Type of reform  Registration  Redistribution Restitution  Recognition 
Strengthen existing 
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Rather than lumping all types of land tenure reform together, it is useful to 
distinguish between major types of reforms which have different characteristics and 
objectives. In this paper we use “4 Rs”: registration, redistribution, restitution, and 
recognition. However, as with different forms of decentralization, countries may 
engage in several types of land tenure reform simultaneously, as in South Africa, 
which has had constitutionally mandated programs of land restitution, 
redistribution, and recognition of communal land rights to redress the highly 
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skewed distribution of land rights that is seen as both a manifestation and cause of 
injustice (Wisborg and Rohde, 2005). Even a single program may combine aspects 
of different types of reforms. Nevertheless, looking at each type helps to identify 
how they interact with state and society at different levels, especially in the context 
of decentralization. 
This section will look at the 4 Rs each in turn, explaining what types of 
reforms are undertaken as part of the specific process, and what role decentralized 
bodies have in the implementation of the reforms. 
Land Registration 
Land registration is one of the most prevalent forms of land tenure reform, often 
designed to reduce ambiguity and increase tenure security. Although the other 
forms of tenure reform discussed below also generally involve some form of 
registration, at its “simplest,” land registration involves the recording of existing 
rights. Registration can include marking of plot boundaries, local mapping of 
holdings, and community land registries, up through full cadastral surveys and 
titling. In most cases registration focuses on individual rights, but in some cases 
collective rights are registered, as in Liberia (Wiley, 2007) or Mozambique (Chilundo 
et al., 2005). 
Even where the rights do not change hands, this codification of the rights 
changes land tenure in some way—if only by reifying the rights—freezing them as 
they existed at one point in time, and with whatever understanding of those rights 
existed at that time (Benda-Beckmann et al., 2003; Platteau, 1996). Hernando de 
Soto’s reference to customary property rights arrangements as “extralegal,” which 
need to be “legalized,” can even become the basis for effective cancellation of 
customary rights (de Soto, 2000). But this uses a very narrow conception of what is 
“legal” as deriving only from, and conforming to, statutory law, whereas many 
others would recognize legal pluralism—the coexistence of statutory, customary, 
religious, and other types of laws and normative frameworks from which people 
define their property rights (Benda-Beckmann et al., 2003; Meinzen-Dick and 
Pradhan, 2002; Nyamu Musembi, 2007). 
In particular, codification and registration of rights involve reduction in the 
flexibility of customary tenure arrangements and negotiations and their substitution 
by inherently more rigid rules which are assumed to provide “security” (Fourie, 
2004), or which are based on intensive agricultural production systems, rather than 
extensive systems (such as a lack of recognition of rights over fallows or grazing). 
In some cases the change in the content of rights is inadvertent, whereas in others 
there is a deliberate effort to change the content of the rights held (for example, by 
the Derg regime in Ethiopia or the Swynnerton Plan in Kenya). The focus of such 
reforms is on "what rights" rather than "whose rights." Such reforms could for 
example involve privatization, collectivization, tenancy, or the introduction of more 
complex systems of periodical reallocation, as in Ethiopia (Sjastaad, personal 
communication, 11/15/2007). 
Limitations of Land Titling 
Codification can strengthen existing rights by making it clear that the state will 




users of the resource whose rights are not recorded. In particular, registration is 
often associated with full ownership, following a western model. Secondary 
claimants such as pastoralists who have a customary right to graze on the fallow 
fields, landless households who have been able to catch wild fish on flooded paddy 
fields, or those who have gathered wild foods on the land are generally not 
registered, and may thereby lose their claims (Lund, 2006; Meinzen-Dick and 
Mwangi, forthcoming; Odgaard, 2002). The efforts to codify customary tenure in 
Niger’s Code Rural became very contentious, with political repercussions (Lund, 
1997). When rights are 
registered in the name of 
the male “head of 
household” only, it can also 
increase women’s insecurity 
of tenure, or require that 
they put in more labor on 
husbands’ fields in order to 
get use of plots for their 
own production (Lastarria-
Cornhiel, 1997, van Koppen 
et al., 2000). 
Although some have 
claimed that codification is 
critical for investment, 
either to provide incentive 
or access to credit (such as. 
Feder and Feeney, 1991), 
most empirical studies in 
Africa have found that full 
ownership is not necessary, 
and registration does not 
always provide increased 
security (Migot-Adholla et 
al., 1993; Sjaastad and 
Bromley, 1997; Sawadogo 
and Stamm, 2000; Jacoby 
and Minten, 2007; Nyamu 
Musembi, 2007). Indeed, 
some find the titling process 
and transferability to be a 
source of insecurity, either 
because elites would have 
an advantage in obtaining 
titles, or because land 
would become alienable, 
particularly to wealthy 
commercial interests (Lund, 
2006). The younger 
generation, in particular, is 
Box 1. Informal Land Registration in 
Madagascar 
Madagascar is an example of a highly 
decentralized informal registration system 
practiced at the local level, which runs parallel to 
the official land administration. Instead of updating 
the land titles, which is a very costly process (in 
terms of both money and time), local people go 
the village head to have their land transactions 
certified in the form of contracts (Jacoby and 
Minten, 2007). These have the advantage of 
tapping into local knowledge of who is the rightful 
holder of the land by calling witnesses. This 
system of using contracts, generally called “petits 
papiers,” to serve as proof of purchase and 
ownership is also practiced in other African 
countries. While it often serves as adequate 
security of tenure within the community, it may 
not withstand challenges from outsiders who may 
use their greater access to formal titling systems 
to place a claim on the land. Jacoby and Minten 
(2007: 462) point out that “[i]ndigenous tenure, 
through a set of well understood and respected 
rules governing land use and transfer within the 
community, imparts a certain degree of tenure 
security and could thus render land titling largely 
redundant. Indeed, establishing a modern property 
rights system without legally recognizing informal 
rights may expand the scope for rent-seeking, 
thus creating additional insecurity (Atwood, 1990). 
Such tenure uncertainty can in turn create demand 
for formalization where previously none existed. 
According to Bruce et al. (1997, p. 259): “Much of 
the titling demand for smallholders in Africa can be 
viewed as ‘preemptive’—representing an attempt 
to prevent the state from allocating the land to 
someone else, rather than the expression of a felt 




often left out, especially if the elder male “land owner” has other opportunities to 
lease out or sell the land beyond the family (Amanor, 2003). Wiley notes that the 
market-driven titling reforms in the African context often seek more to bring as 
much customary land into the market place for investor acquisition than to secure 
customary rights and benefits (Wiley, 2006). Ensuring that the poor, in particular, 
are not dispossessed, she argues, requires a more action-based and community 
driven evolutionary process in which local people identify the priorities to reduce 
the chronic tenure insecurity of the poor. 
Nor is this confined to Africa. There is an assumption underlying many titling 
reforms that assigning legally secure, marketable rights will give access to credit as 
well as additional assets via rental and sales markets (Carter, 2004; de Soto, 
2000). But in reviewing the experience in Honduras and Nicaragua with “market-
friendly” reforms, Boucher found that although there were major increases in 
titling, these were not accompanied by increases in credit and land access (Boucher 
et al., 2005). In part this is because access to credit is limited for the poor, 
especially in remote rural areas, and there are alternative forms of collateral that 
provide as much assurance as the title to land, given the difficulties in eviction and 
so on. But it is also that people are reluctant to use their land as collateral. In a 
review of a number of titling programs in Africa, “there is little evidence in the case 
studies that poor groups seek to use land titles as collateral. In general, the risk of 
losing land is felt to be too great, and employment and income are key factors in 
obtaining loans” (Lund, 2006:11). 
Decentralization and Pro-poor Land Registration 
But pro-poor land registration can relate to much more limited but important things 
than full titling. For example, strengthening tenancy agreements can provide for 
relatively secure temporary access to land and create more stable incomes for the 
rural poor (de Janvry et al., 2001). Simplification of procedures for registration may 
also make it more affordable for smallholders to register their land. For example, 
registering a lease on stool land in Ghana can involve four government agencies, 
seven procedures, and take more than a year on average and cost over 4 percent 
of the total value of the land (Knuty-Mensah, 2006). By contrast, the 
computerization of the land registry in Karnataka, India, has dramatically reduced 
the time and cost of obtaining land registration information and made the 
information available at internet kiosks in villages, which has also improved the 
transparency of the land records and reduced bribes paid to obtain titles 
(Bhatnagar, 2003). But not all reforms require high technology: there are 
innovative processes for registering land rights in Ethiopia, Niger, Mozambique, 
South Africa, and Uganda, such as the use of verbal as well as written evidence for 
registering land rights, and the registration of individual or collective rights in 
Mozambique and Niger (Lund, 2006). The successful implementation of all of these, 
however, hinges upon the development of decentralized systems with active local 
involvement. 
Decentralization can help registration become more attuned to the needs of 
the poor in several ways. First, by bringing registration opportunities closer to the 
rural areas, decentralized land administration—whether through local branches of 
central authorities or through local government entities—can reduce the transaction 




advantage in terms of knowledge of how to register the land and lower costs to get 
to the necessary government offices. Decentralized offices are also more able to tap 
local input about who is the holder of the right. They could even use local expertise 
on what secondary claimants exist, although this is less likely to be recorded and 
not always in the interest of local elites. Finally, where central state institutions are 
not trusted by the poor, the involvement of decentralized local institutions can build 
legitimacy for the land registries (Lund, 2006), but this is more likely to succeed 
where there is relatively high social capital and good leadership (Deininger, 2001). 
Decentralization and Women’s Rights to Land 
After studying the effects of conversion of customary tenure to titling and 
development of land markets in Malawi, Holden found that women, in particular, 
had lost land rights in the process (Holden et al., 2006). They recommend special 
mechanisms to protect women against direct discrimination and indirect processes 
of marginalization, as well as the establishment of local land committees and land 
tribunals for conflict resolution to create more democratic and transparent local 
management of land resources. Where local tribunals or other bodies are involved 
in land registration, it is critical that women be represented in these bodies, to 
increase the likelihood that women will be able to register their rights. In Amhara, 
Ethiopia, although the land registration policy stipulates that both husband and wife 
be listed on the form, most local land administration committees were only 
composed of men and local leaders and government officials had not promoted 
women’s participation, but where women were part of committees, they were active 
in protecting women’s rights, particularly of women who were vulnerable and 
lacked family support or social networks (Teklu, 2005). 
But experience has shown that increasing women’s participation is harder to 
achieve in practice than in theory. In Niger, decentralized land commissions 
seemed to strengthen women’s land rights, but as yet had limited influence and 
were not enough to offset pressures on the land and the economic marginalization 
of women in agriculture (Diarra and Monimart, 2006). Uganda’s experience with 
decentralization accompanying changes in the land law exemplify the challenges 
involved. The 1998 Land Act made provision for parish-level Land Committees and 
District Land Boards. The Land Committees were charged with recording third-party 
rights over customary land (occupation or use) “to safeguard rights of women, 
absent persons, minors” (Coldham, 2000: 68). The Act also made provisions for 
significant women’s representation on these bodies, to increase the accessibility of 
rural people to registration and arbitration systems. However, funding has not been 
appropriated to implement these provisions consistently. Consequently, the 
incidence of land conflicts has not reduced, with women and female-headed 
households particularly affected (Deininger and Castagnini, 2006). District Land 
Boards had to rotate through different areas, resulting in long delays in hearing 
cases and arbitrating disputes. The question of how to provide land registration at 
the local level that is accessible to the interests of women and the poor and 
safeguards against elite capture remains unresolved. 
Although the role of democracy is not clear-cut with regard to land reforms, 
it is likely that compared an authoritarian system, a democratic system would 
facilitate acceptance and implementation of land registration programs, which 




registration does indeed broaden legitimate access of land for more people—and in 
particular for previously socially and economically marginalized groups—this should 
contribute to broaden participation in the polity. 
In summary, registration is the most basic of the four types of land reform, 
with the aim of codifying existing and mostly individual land rights, previously often 
managed by customary or traditional systems. While reform can generally be 
planned and administered centrally, decentralized bodies have a crucial role in 
tapping into local knowledge to identify rights holders, and conflicting or multiple 
rights and to be able to solve conflicts. Examples reviewed for this paper also reveal 
that local registries, when kept transparent, decrease the cost for registration by 
local people. 
Redistributive Land Reforms 
The term “land reform” is generally associated with redistribution of land from large 
land owners to the tenants or the landless, but in many cases, rather than taking 
land from existing land owners, it is state land that is (re)allocated, as in the first 
phases of the Philippine land reform program. These reforms have been variously 
associated with objectives of increasing equity or productivity, reducing poverty, 
and responding to political demands and agitation. 
Redistributive reforms require a strong central government commitment, 
either to expropriate land from private land owners or to transfer state lands to 
individuals (a form of privatization). Unless initiatives by peasants to take over 
lands reach critical mass or are supported by the state, they are often repressed 
(Paige, 1996). Decentralization can make redistributive reforms more difficult if 
landed elites dominate the locally-elected bodies and can block redistribution. 
State-led Land Redistribution 
But as important as this centralized state commitment is, the implementation of the 
reforms requires considerable local information—about land characteristics as well 
as about the people (management capabilities, farming experience) who should 
receive it. In reviewing land reforms, inadequate administrative capacity for land 
reform is a recurring problem because not only are accurate land tenure records 
needed, but it also takes a large field staff to inform people of their entitlements 
and facilitate the legal processes of land acquisition and distribution (Adams, 1995). 
For most countries, land reform is an extremely difficult and politically charged 
process to carry through, requiring strong central government institutions and a 
grassroots organization being part of larger NGO network to maintain the pressure 
for reforms. In the Philippines, partnership between government, NGOs and 
people's organizations provided many of the field staff. But in Colombia, centralized 
state-led implementation of agrarian reform redistributed properties with limited 
local government, private sector, or civil society involvement restricted 
beneficiaries’ ability to gain access to productive and social infrastructure, markets, 
and technical assistance, and reduced transparency and independent monitoring 
and evaluation (Deininger, 2007). In Nicaragua land reform policies have even tried 
to replace the authority of community leaders in decision-making on land 




Market-led Land Redistribution 
Negotiated or “market-assisted” land reforms have been proposed as a means of 
reducing the administrative burdens of redistributive reforms. However, experience 
with market-assisted land reform has been mixed (Carter, 2004; World Bank, 
2003). If land markets are “thin” (especially when there are few sellers and many 
potential customers) the poor are often unable to buy land because they cannot 
find information about possible sellers and adequate prices. Even with credit, 
people with less education and access to information may not be able to identify or 
obtain suitable land. Central coordination (and even expropriation) is often needed 
to match sellers and buyers, particularly when the buyers are not located in the 
same place as the sellers. But if those who purchase land cannot farm it profitably 
enough to repay, they may end up in debt (Di Gregorio et al., forthcoming). 
Because they do not require such lumpy payments, rental markets are an 
easier mechanism for the poor to access land, but ironically, many conventional 
land reforms have put in restrictions on land rentals or prompted landlords to evict 
their tenants for fear of having land expropriated (de Janvry et al., 2001). 
Identifying an appropriate balance between security of tenancy and encouragement 
of land rentals is critical for ensuring that the poor have secure access to land. 
Market-led agrarian reform is implemented in a very decentralized manner 
whereby local government facilitates direct interaction between buyers and sellers 
of land (Binswanger and Deininger, 1997; Deininger, 1999). The “willing buyer, 
willing seller” approach as it is implemented in South Africa for example, proved to 
be major bottleneck because properties are transferred one-by-one, each requiring 
an individual business plan. Yet, most potential beneficiaries do not have the 
knowledge and resources to develop such a plan (Cliffe, 2007). Critiques of this 
market-led approach also emphasize that it does not take the political nature of 
redistribution, and of markets, into account (Bobrow-Strain, 2004; Lahiff et al., 
2007). 
State-led land reforms are controlled and implemented in a much more 
centralized fashion, because it is recognized that local level administrations often do 
neither provide information nor act in favor of the poorer and powerless but in favor 
of landlords, as the latter tend to control governance at local level. For example, 
market-led approaches in Brazil and Colombia and voluntary land transfers in the 
Philippines resulted in corruption and unfavorable outcomes for poor farmers. The 
most successful state-led reforms, on the other hand, were centrally implemented 
and were getting the needed local information through interaction with a wide array 
of societal actors (Borras, 2006). Involvement of local government (gram 
panchayats) in West Bengal, India in the land reform process, shows, however, that 
reform does not have to be carried out centrally to be successful, but the strong 
traditions of local democracy were instrumental in this. Still, limited knowledge of 
the land reform regulations and gender bias led to omissions of unmarried women 
on the beneficiary lists, and points to the need of control by higher level 
administration officials (Hanstad et al., 2004). 
Rather than the politically or financially costly process of expropriating or 
buying land from large private owners, the state may also implement redistributive 
land reforms by transferring rights over public lands to individuals or groups. But 
transfer of state land requires no less local involvement than other types of land 




risk that such transfers can actually hurt some of the poor where local rights are 
exercised by smallholders (informal owners, tenants, or farm laborers), pastoralists 
or forest-dependent communities, but not recognized by the state. In India, the 
village commons is generally registered as state land and may even be labeled 
“waste land” in government registers. The same applied for large parts of West 
African rangelands. It thus looks good if “waste lands” are given to certain poor 
families. But if in the process many more poor families can lose access to common 
property they depended on for their livelihoods. Some form of local involvement is 
needed to verify the existing users and claimants of the resource (see discussion of 
recognition, below). 
Cross checks on those who implement redistributive reforms are needed, 
whether allocating state land or expropriated private land because of the potential 
for rent seeking, clientelism, and the exclusion of ethnic minorities and women (Di 
Gregorio et al., forthcoming). Even after the land is (re)allocated, ongoing support 
is needed to ensure that those who acquire it can use it productively. In Zimbabwe, 
for example, initial land reform efforts included state support for the new farmers 
and their welfare improved, but as the support decreased, the livelihoods of 
resettled households shifted back to resemble other farmers in communal areas 
who had not benefited from land reform (Chimowu and Hulme, 2006). Similarly in 
Northern Cape province of South Africa, poor technical support and the risky nature 
of agriculture led to the land reforms having limited impact on reducing poverty 
(Bradstock, 2005). 
Redistributive reforms aim at transferring land from large landowners to the 
landless to address issues of social justice and to level inequality in a society. Land 
is mostly redistributed to individuals with full ownership over the land. Market-led 
redistributive reform can be seen as the most decentralized type of land reform, 
whereby sellers and buyers find each other in a land market. In practice, however, 
land markets favor large land owners because potential beneficiaries lack 
information, resources and capacities to enter into negotiations. Beyond the 
planning of a land reform, state-led redistribution requires central coordination and, 
at times, force to overcome resistance of large landholders. But involvement of 
local institutions is still required to successfully implement the reforms. Both 
market- and state-led reforms thus require a central commitment and coordination 
as well as considerable involvement of decentralized bodies to plan, manage and 
implement the reform. 
Democratic governance should facilitate acceptance and political will of elites 
to accommodate land redistribution policies. It is likely, though, that in countries 
with skewed land distribution, the limited political representation of substantial 
sections of society might reduce the likelihood of reforms in the first place. Usually 
pressure from below, demands by civil society organization and a degree of 
contention are needed to design and implement reforms. If redistribution results in 
more equal distribution of land it might contribute to broadening of access of 
citizens to the political system, possibly strengthening democratic tendencies or 
contributing to democratic rule. However, these are by no means automatic 
outcomes. What is important for redistribution to contribute to broader citizenship, 
participation in the polity, and poverty reduction is that it is designed and 
implemented in a way that truly results in a widening of access to land and 




therefore important that the rights of indigenous groups be recognized by the state 
before redistributive land reforms are undertaken. 
Restitution 
Land restitution can be seen as variant of redistributive land reform that addresses 
past injustices, as in South Africa, Zimbabwe, in post-socialist societies such as 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia,
7 or after violent conflict. In addition to the 
challenges of regular land redistribution programs, land restitution is invariably 
linked to rectifying injustices of the past and the state has to decide what 
constitutes legitimate claims to that end. This, in turn requires addressing the 
question of how recent the expropriation of land has to be to qualify for restitution, 
and to what degree compensation has served as a substitute for restitution. Such a 
process requires new institutions to do the necessary analysis (eligible claims, 
current users or owners and so on) and also to settle on an out-of-court basis 
disputes that arise and settle old disputes that were never addressed by 
government. Land restitution itself can be seen as the settlement of long existing 
“old” land disputes as well as redistribution of a major economic asset in society. 
Although many countries have addressed restitution at the individual level, 
South Africa and Namibia also used the approach of restoration of communal 
property ownership. This process has led to satisfying legal results but has not lead 
to full reconstitution of communities. The claims of unified communities who were 
capable of setting up a campaign for their land were accelerated under the first ANC 
administration because their claims resonated with the party. While communities 
portrayed themselves as unified to get their land back, they were not always unified 
enough to take on the challenges following the land restitution to manage the 
communal property. Tensions with neighboring communities or internal 
disagreement lead to stagnation in their development, particularly when the 
communities were not able to take advantage of other opportunities offered by the 
state that require cooperation among the community (Everingham and Jannecke, 
2006). 
                                                      
 
7 Lerman et al., (2004) analyze the different strategies to reform the farming sector. While many 
Eastern European Countries decided to restore land to previous owners, most of the former Soviet 
Republics decided instead to distribute land to farm workers. In all countries large collective and 
corporate farms still play a prominent role, even though the countries which have gone through a 
restitution process have a much larger share of individual ownership. Restitution itself was a 
cumbersome process with many obstacles, and was handled in a rather centralized manner. The 
Hungarian example which gave beneficiaries the choice between different assets other than land to 




Box 2. Restitution in South Africa 
The Chatha “betterment” claim in South 
Africa is an example of the importance of 
the involvement of all stake holders in 
negotiation around restitution. Starting in 
the 1950s, the so-called betterment policies 
were used to control rangeland degradation 
by redefining land use in rural villages, and 
forcibly resettling villagers into new 
residential areas. Because returning to the 
original settlement pattern was seen as 
undesirable by all parties, negotiations led 
to the creation of a development package 
and support to develop and implement a 
development plan, which again resulted in 
the creation of a Settlement Support and 
Development Planning division within the 
Regional Land Claims Commission to 
support claimants after settlement. 
Restitution claims over nature 
reserves constitute another complicated 
case. The case of Dwesa-Cwebe resulted in 
a decentralized management scheme, 
handing over two reserves to a trust and 
establishing co-management between 
claimants and national conservation 
authorities. This settlement agreement 
answers questions such as “who 
represented the community and, in the 
context of powerful tribal authorities and 
traditional leaders, to whom, or to what 
structure, ownership of the land should be 
restored” (Lahiff, 2003: 29). 
Objectives of Land Restitution 
Even where there are legal provisions for restitution, it may be beyond the capacity 
of those who have lost land to reacquire it, without external assistance. This is 
especially the case when those who have lost out are from indigenous groups or 
other ethnic minorities with less familiarity with the statutory legal system, or 
where expropriation took place generations ago, as in the former Soviet Union or 
South Africa. Powerful individuals and corporations may further block their access, 
especially where valuable minerals or forest resources are involved. For example, 
Bolivia’s 1996 agrarian reform law created a provision for indigenous people to 
claim their “original community 
territories” but it took 11 years 
and the assistance of several 
outside NGOs for the 33 
Chiquitano communities to 
document their claims, refute the 
claims of non-indigenous people, 
and to receive title to 3,830 
square miles of territory that they 
had been evicted from in the 
1700s (Hufstader, 2007). 
The stated aim of restitution 
is generally to redress unjust 
expropriation of land or other 
assets. This inherently involves 
political assessments of what is 
“unjust,” but it is not necessarily 
linked to poverty reduction in 
either aim or outcome. South 
Africa, for example, has given 
property back to those whose 
original ownership of it assured 
them a middle-class status, and 
was thus less an achievement of 
redistributive social justice than a 
re-establishment of the status quo 
ante (James, 2007). Many post-
socialist societies have also 
engaged in restitution of land. 
Examples in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia show that restitution 
was a difficult legal and 
administrative process that often 
led to a high degree of absentee 
ownership because those who 




longer farmers or locally resident (Giovarelli, 1999). As in South Africa, the 
outcomes of restitution are likely to depend on whether restitution is sought to 
redress past wrongs or a present desire to reoccupy and use the land. 
Land Restitution after Violent Conflicts 
Land restitution is also on the agenda in post-conflict settings such as Rwanda, 
Guatemala, and Bosnia (Leckie, 2003; Philpott, 2006). Claims after wars deal with 
dislocation, transmigration, resettlement, and eviction. For example, returning 
refugees find their house and land occupied by other displaced people who have not 
yet or do not want to return to their former village. Problems also arise because the 
population does not wait for a new legal system to put deal with their tenure issues 
as informal and formal tenure systems often evolve in different ways in post-
conflict situations (Unruh, 2004). Furthermore, wars often destroy both central 
government capacity and that of local institutions. Loss of land and other records, 
physical changes to the countryside, and disruption of the social fabric through 
migration or death make restoration more difficult. Restoring the land to the 
original holders may not be possible where there has been much death and 
destruction. But setting up processes to deal with land disputes through 
adjudication and negotiation using formal courts, land commissions and customary 
negotiation mechanisms are necessary for reconciliation as well as for people to use 
the land effectively (FAO, 2005). 
Post-conflict situations, however, also represent windows of opportunity for 
land policy reforms as the examples of Mozambique and East Timor, and with the 
right support new land policies can be developed with considerable input from 
below. Extensive local knowledge of history of the land and people is required to 
settle claims and to build legitimacy for the settlement—which is equally necessary 
for rebuilding after violent conflict (Unruh, 2002). At the same time countries after 
a conflict, especially after civil war, focus on national unity and central governments 
will be reluctant to decentralize power to the local level. In Mozambique, for 
example, communities have the first right to exploit their area and any investor will 
have to negotiate with the local community to be able to exploit natural resources 
commercially. To apply for a concession the investor still has to go to central 
government and some of the benefits the community receives are also channeled 
through central government (Tanner et al., 2006). 
Restitution processes are the most complicated land reform processes as 
they require the state to make a judgment of past actions and take position for or 
against groups of society. This can only be done at a national level and needs to be 
based on a far-reaching societal consensus because of the high conflict potential 
that is part of this process. The implementation of this process, however, has to be 
undertaken in a decentralized manner. As the example of Zimbabwe, and case in 
other Southern African countries have shown, it is crucial to maintain a transparent 
and accountable process. Decisions by the central government without involvement 
from local people are in many cases not perceived as just, nor are cases in which 
local people are left to themselves, and where the more powerful party prevails. 
Restitution usually occurs after a substantial political change or end of 
conflict. Democratization processes might facilitate the acceptance of undertaking a 
restitution policy, and provide for the basis to put forth demands for restitution. 




marginalized citizens within the political system, thus strengthening democratic 
governance. 
Recognition of Land Rights 
State recognition of land uses that are already being exercised without government 
approval represents a fourth category of land tenure reform. The recognition of the 
land rights of indigenous peoples provides an important example of such reforms.
8 
The rights of people living on land that the state claims as government property for 
protected areas (such as national parks), forests, or rangelands may also be 
strengthened or transformed through state recognition. These two categories often 
overlap, as in India’s Scheduled Tribes (Recognition of Forest Rights) Bill (Sen and 
Lalhrietpui, 2006), which recognized the rights of certain tribal groups who had 
been living for three generations within lands declared as national forest areas. 
Even where local people have been de facto users and managers of the resource 
and the state has had little capacity to actually manage the resource or evict them, 
recognition can strengthen the security of tenure for the users. 
However, even with good legislation to support indigenous right as in the 
Philippines and Nicaragua, in practice commercial exploitation of resources, often 
promoted by donors and multilateral development agencies, has priority over 
indigenous rights (Xanthaki, 2003). Similar problems have been found in India, 
where mining or other major commercial interests compete with tribal land uses in 
forest areas (EPW, 2007), and in Africa, where commercial interests seek 
concessions to exploit forest resources, develop plantations, mining, or even 
ecotourism (Lund, 2006; Wiley, 2006). The companies seeking concessions are 
often foreign, and the prospect of foreign exchange, tax revenue, or promised job 
creation exerts a powerful sway on the governments, and this is too often 
reinforced by donors. These expectations are relatively easy to quantify, but the 
loss of livelihoods, environmental quality, and right of self-determination for people 
currently using the land are too easily overlooked or undervalued. 
Unlike redistribution or restitution, recognition strengthens the rights of 
existing users, rather than transferring the land to others. In this recognition is 
similar to registration. However, recognition differs from registration in several 
important ways. Whereas the majority of registration, redistribution, and restitution 
reforms are likely to deal with individual land rights, recognition reforms are more 
likely to deal with collective land rights (see Table 1). However, recognition is less 
likely than the other reforms to involve full ownership rights; instead, there is 
usually a more limited or conditional set of use rights with restrictions on what can 
be done with the land in terms of its management or transfer to others. For 
example, the Sarawak and Sabah states in Malaysia recognize the “native 
customary rights” of indigenous groups that allows them a degree of control over 
land they have been occupying and cultivating, but stop short of ownership. Both 
Vietnam and Cambodia constrain indigenous people’s agricultural activities 
(Xanthaki, 2003). One reason for this is that many of these lands are areas of 
particular ecological significance (often for their biodiversity and or hydrological 
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functions) or of economic interest (timber). Special efforts are required to assure 
national and even international stakeholders that the local users will not deplete the 
resource base (Jairath and Smyth, 2003). These limited rights may still require 
changes in national legislation, such as the Pastoral Land Act in Mauritania or the 
Scheduled Tribes (Recognition of Forest Rights) Bill in India to reconcile state law 
with customary practices and resource use patterns. 
Effectiveness of Customary Institutions in Resource Management 
The issues of recognition of customary land rights are not confined to indigenous 
groups. Wiley notes that in Africa over 90 percent of the rural population access 
land through customary mechanisms (Wiley, 2006). There is considerable insecurity 
because the land can be reallocated by government to logging, agribusiness, or 
other powerful interests. Reforms in a small but growing number of cases in Africa 
that accord customary rights equivalent legal force with those acquired through 
non-indigenous systems can strengthen tenure security of local inhabitants and 
users. However, to be effective these need to be accompanied by support for the 
devolved governance of these rights at local levels, and build upon customary 
norms. 
Recognition reforms are closely associated with devolution programs because 
they involve the state ceding to local user groups and indigenous people the right 
to use, and often to manage, land and related resources that the state has claimed. 
The requirements for local involvement are even stronger in such reforms than in 
other types of land tenure reforms. In the other types, local institutions can play a 
key role in the allocation of rights and settlement of disputes, but in devolution, 
local institutions also need to allocate the rights within the group and attend to the 
ongoing management of the resource itself. This requires that the groups have 
authority to set and enforce rules. Consequently, as in the case of indigenous land 
rights claims in Latin America, land rights are stronger when the legal system also 
recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples to manage their own affairs (Ortiga, 
2004). Thus many of the indigenous rights movements frame their demands for 
land within claims for broader political and territorial rights (Haughney, 2006)—that 
is, going beyond devolution programs focusing on resource management to 
demands for effective political decentralization to provide for stronger local control. 
This is particularly important because for many indigenous people, the meaning of 
land goes beyond its economic value to include social identity and even spiritual 
values, which can, in turn, reinforce social capital and solidarity (Hitchcok and 
Vinding, 2004; Kuba and Lentz, 2006). 
Achieving this involves giving autonomy to groups (be it indigenous people or 
other types of community) to devise own management rules, including rules 
managing individual rights within communal areas. Although some devolution 
programs convey only use rights, management and exclusion rights are more 
meaningful because they empower people to make decisions about the resource 
and prevent others from using it. Allowing local people to manage the resource is 
important to exploit the potential advantages of decentralization, tapping into local 
knowledge to develop rules that are adapted to local conditions, rather than 
generalized, externally-imposed rules that may lack local legitimacy. There are 
numerous studies to indicate that communities can craft effective rules to manage 




such collective action does not always arise. The likelihood is conditioned on a 
number of characteristics of the resource itself, of the user group, and of the 
governance system. In particular, the way that the state interacts with user groups 
is critical—it can either support users with recognition of their rights to set rules 
and providing backstopping through technical information and resources, or it can 
undermine local decision-making by devolving responsibility without meaningful 
rights, or transferring rights over only the most degraded lands, and generally 
provide disabling, rather than enabling, framework. 
Customary Institutions and Accountability 
There are calls to strengthen the role of customary authorities to build up 
democratic local governance systems. Such reforms have to be carefully 
administered, however. In Ghana for example, timber is recognized as the property 
of the chiefs. National policy vested all trees in the president who manages timber 
on behalf of the chiefs. This system was set up to secure timber concessions on 
farm land, and practically stripped farmers of their rights to the trees on their land, 
giving the chiefs the authority to allow and benefit from timber exploitation 
(Amanor, 2004). 
Thus, indigenous or other local resource users may not share land equally 
among their members, and women, in particular, are often excluded from land and 
other rights.
9 Moreover, they may not manage the resource as outsiders would 
want it managed, and this is compounded if there is fiscal decentralization and 
shortage of funds. Decentralization policies in the forestry sector in Uganda led to 
variable outcomes on the extent of forest protection. Losses in forest cover were 
linked to a decline in government funding for forest guards, who had previously not 
only been technically competent, but both upwardly and downwardly accountable, 
and had monitored the rules for forest management (Banana et al., 2007). Thus, 
strengthening land rights of indigenous peoples is not a simple question of granting 
title, but involves addressing a more complex set of interrelated legal, technical, 
social, economic, and political issues (Ortiga, 2004). 
Recognition differs from the other three types of land reform in two ways. 
First, it looks at recognizing or strengthening the rights of current land users and 
does not aim to take land from one to give it to another, although there might be 
overlapping claims which need to be settled in advance. Secondly, it usually deals 
with collective rights to land and other resources by user groups or whole 
communities such as indigenous peoples. Administering and managing these 
different rights at the national level is in most cases ineffective because land 
relations are very localized and complex. Instead, management of the resources is 
best devolved to the user groups themselves ensuring that group leaders are 
accountable to all members and not only to the group’s elite. While recognition 
entails devolution of resources to local users, one crucial role for central 
government, which is often needed to undertake recognition policies, is the revision 
of the national legal system to include new actors as legal holders of land (such as 
recognition of indigenous people, tribal social groups, or others). 
                                                      
 





Recognition itself is a way to widen citizens’ participation in social life and can 
thus be interpreted as increasing democratic space. At the same time substantive 
democracy should facilitate this inclusion, thus possibly put less hurdles on the 
implementation of recognition programs. However, when these policies involve 
considerable changes in rights to valuable resources, central governments—
authoritarian as well as democratic—often tend to prioritize economic development 
over social justice, unless civil society exercises considerable pressure. Finally, in 
order to broaden social inclusion, recognition policies should be considered and 
implemented before any policies regarding registration or redistribution policies in 
countries where a substantial section of the population manages lands under 
unclear legal status. This is particularly important where traditional land 
management is based on collective or mixed collective-individual property rights 
arrangements. 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Both decentralization and land policies are highly politically charged issues. Because 
land policies assign control over resources that are critical for both identity and 
livelihoods, they will be contentious. Although there is currently considerable 
discussion about land tenure reform, it is important to distinguish among the 
different types of reform. In the “4 Rs” discussed in this paper, there is a rough 
progression in terms of how politically contentious the processes are, from 
registration to recognition. Registering existing rights is generally less politically 
contentious to pass in legislation (particularly where parliamentarians are 
influenced by Western training), although it is often problematic to put into 
practice, particularly if the reforms are not only registering existing rights, but 
changing the nature of those rights in the process, as often happens with titling. 
Redistribution is considerably more contentious and requires more political 
commitment. However, where there are large constituencies who receive land, this 
can be quite popular. Restitution inherently involves judgments of what are 
considered “unjust” expropriation of land, and often occurs in stressful times, such 
as post-conflict or in other times of social transformation (such as post-socialist or 
post-apartheid). Recognition may be the most difficult, politically, because, whereas 
registration involves the extension of the state’s authority over land, recognition 
involves the state recognizing the rights of whole groups to land that has often 
been, at least on paper, state land. When this is accompanied by stronger 
recognition of other types of autonomy for these groups, who are often marginal 
groups, politically, it can be even more controversial. 
Political Economy of Land Policies 
Acknowledging these political aspects can also help to explain why there is often a 
gap between plans (which are often donor-led) and implementation, because the 
people that are in the decision-making positions often have no incentive to 
implement programs if they would lose out, or they may be blocked from 
implementing reforms by those who stand to lose out. Moreover, the tensions are 
not only among farmers within a community: increasingly, pressures for land come 




country. The combination of these firms’ seeking profit and the governments’ 
seeking revenue—often abetted by donors encouraging these enterprises for 
economic growth—has too often led to the loss of land and livelihoods, especially 
for the poor and marginalized. Thus, donors such as UNDP who care about poverty 
reduction need to be careful to look at the consequences of such “development” 
enterprises, especially on the rights of those who have been using the resources. 
This will require first policy dialogue regarding what approaches are to be used and 
then, potentially, capacity building of central and local authorities to implement the 
reforms to ensure that the poor benefit from land tenure reforms. 
Registration and titling are part of many donor agendas, and often find favor 
with national governments. But these policies often import ideas of property rights 
and “ownership” that are not grounded in the local social or physical environment. 
In some cases such as peri-urban contexts or where there is considerable risk of 
expropriation, such reforms can help strengthen property rights. However, national 
legal reforms for titling impose nation-wide definitions of rights, and therefore limit 
the scope of local land administration, as well as local practices of organizing land 
(“customary rights”). In policy dialogue, rather than pushing one common agenda 
such as registration, therefore, it is important of donors such as UNDP to identify 
the needs of each country and region—what are the greatest sources of tenure 
insecurity for the poor, and how can they be addressed? What local practices can be 
built upon? Would registration of private lands be more beneficial than recognizing 
the collective use rights of groups? When registration is selected, programs that 
conduct registration locally using oral and written testimony are likely to reduce the 
barriers for the poor to participate. And registering land in the name of husband 
and wife can help to reduce the loss of land rights of women—both within the 
marriage as well as in case of widowhood or divorce. 
Decentralization and the Role of the State 
The successful implementation of all forms of land tenure reform discussed here call 
for some substantial role of centralized governments, as well as some forms of 
organized local involvement. However, this does not imply that all have to be 
subsumed into one formalized arrangement subject to state law. Legal pluralism 
will persist, and it is better to realize that state, “customary” and a range of local 
customs will shape what is seen as legitimate access to land. Then those that 
contribute most to the interests of the poorest and most disadvantaged can be 
played up. There is the potential for decentralization programs to contribute to 
strengthening local institutions to participate in the identification of the “right” right 
holders and in administration, adjudication, enforcement, and conflict management. 
As in the case of other aspects of natural resource management (such as forestry, 
fisheries, water management), so also in the case of land tenure there has been 
growing recognition of the limitations of state capacities of delivering services, 
especially in rural areas. Not only are the costs of providing services in many rural 
areas very high, but state institutions often lack the local knowledge needed to be 
effective. This has prompted a search for ways to supplement state capacity by 
involving local people, often through decentralization or devolution programs. 
But getting that local involvement is not always easy. First, central 
authorities have often been reluctant to transfer real authority to local bodies, 




ambiguity and contention regarding whether the appropriate local bodies are 
outposts of government departments, locally elected councils, chiefs or other 
customary authorities, newly constituted user groups, NGOs, or even private firms. 
The local institutions that are selected are not always forthcoming to pick up the 
additional costs for their participation, and it generally requires a substantial state 
investment of time, personnel, and funds to set up the partnerships between 
central and local institutions and build their capacity to carry out their expected 
roles in land tenure reform. 
Even if local institutions are developed, their participation does not always 
lead to equitable outcomes favoring the poor. Within local, as well as national, 
institutions there is the possibility of elite capture. Women, ethnic minorities, or 
other socially excluded groups may face more obstacles to securing land rights 
under local authorities than from other government entities, who as “outsiders” 
may not be as steeped in the particular norms that discriminate against these 
groups. Indeed, the more unequal communities are in terms of land distribution 
(and hence the greater the need for land reform), the less likelihood there is that 
local institutions will prioritize the needs of the poor (Galasso and Ravallion, 2005). 
Thus, while reallocation of land can contribute to more democratic decentralized 
governance institutions, decentralized institutions may not be able to challenge 
local power structures enough to achieve this without continued pressure from the 
central state to ensure that equity concerns are addressed. 
Many decentralization programs fail to live up to expectations because the 
local bodies are given additional responsibilities without additional financial or 
human resources and capacity. In this context land tenure, in particular, may come 
under particular pressure because it represents a potential source of income. 
Rather than strengthening the rights of local poor people to land, the local 
governments may seek revenue by giving rights to business enterprises, even 
multinational companies, as indicated by the Indonesian, Brazilian, and Chinese 
cases cited above. Forest resources are especially vulnerable to overexploitation 
and depletion to provide revenue for local government when other financial 
resources are inadequate (Gregerson et al., 2004). Where local bodies get 
allocations from the center, they may not prioritize to spend it on land or other 
resource management (such as forest guards) instead of education, infrastructure, 
or other programs. Thus, ensuring adequate funding for land governance is a key 
concern. 
Although decentralization is not a panacea for achieving effective and 
equitable land tenure policies, it still offers important opportunities for building the 
necessary institutional framework for state-society interactions. This will not be 
achieved through any blanket prescriptions, but rather by engaging in the complex 
social, economic, and ecological contexts that shape the outcomes of 
decentralization as well as land tenure reform. Because of the high variability 
between sites and the complexity of claimants and tenure arrangements, “a 
detailed understanding of local reality, even if it takes time to develop, should be 
seen as essential in both land restitution and in the rights enquiry processes which 
government policy proposes to employ for resolving conflicting and overlapping 
claims to tenure rights” (Kepe, 1999:415). Unfortunately, the local reality often 
falls outside the realm of statutory legal structures, and efforts to “legalize” these 




reforms, which do not easily accommodate local variations that have emerged to 
adapt to the biophysical and socioeconomic environment. 
Pro-poor Land Policies 
Decentralized governance may be less effective in delivering pro-poor land policies 
where there is a high degree of inequality, either within communities (potential elite 
capture), between communities and non-local stakeholders such as timber or 
mining companies (lack of bargaining power), and between communities. When 
there is strong heterogeneity between communities, decentralization gives variable 
performance because each local area has different starting points and local 
institutional arrangements. Although states often desire uniformity (Scott, 1998), 
land tenure needs to adapt to the ecological as well as social and economic 
environment to be appropriate. Thus, some variability, for example between 
individual and collective tenure, private agricultural land vs. common property, and 
in the exact specifications of rights, may be desirable. Indeed, many indigenous 
groups demand the right to be different from the rest of the society. But there also 
need to be checks that certain regions or groups do not lag behind—another 
instance of how state-society interactions are important. 
The analysis of different types of decentralization programs and land tenure 
reforms provides a starting point for identifying appropriate strategies to develop 
the central/local and state/civil society partnerships that can enhance land tenure 
security for the poor. Although the terms “decentralization” and “devolution” are 
often used inconsistently, it is important to consider what authority, resources, and 
responsibility are being transferred (or held by) which types of agencies or local 
groups. Looking for the accountability mechanisms in each arrangement can also 
help identify ways to make them favor the poor. 
Each type of land tenure reform calls for particular types of competence from 
the central government and local entities. Registration and administration of rights 
can be done by central or local authorities, but the costs to local users are likely to 
be higher, the more the registration is centralized and formalized. Higher costs (and 
travel time) for registration are more likely to exclude women and the poor from 
registering. Local registration processes can help redress this problem, but only if 
the local institutions are not biased against women or other disadvantaged groups. 
Programs to simplify procedures and strengthen the capacity of local groups are 
likely to create greater transparency and help ensure that registration processes do 
not contribute to elite capture of land resources. 
Redistribution of land often requires a strong central authority to overcome 
resistance from landed elites. But local involvement is also needed to maintain 
pressure for reforms and identify the appropriate recipients of such land reform. 
Where state land is being transferred, local input is needed to identify any existing 
users that may lose out. 
Similarly, restitution requires a commitment from the state, but perhaps 
even greater local input to identify the appropriate right holders. Conflict 
management is likely to be particularly critical for such contentious reforms. 
Depending on the source of the disputes, local or state institutions may be better 
placed to increase the legitimacy of the restitution and mitigate conflict. Indeed, the 




society after violent conflict if the process involves local people and is seen as 
legitimate, but it can also exacerbate conflicts if the process is seen as unfair. 
Finally, millions of farmers, fishers, and foresters have no formal rights to the 
resources they depend upon. State recognition of such rights can do much to 
strengthen the tenure security, livelihoods, social cohesion and dignity of these 
people. Many of the unrecognized users are indigenous groups or other 
disadvantaged minorities, so strengthening their land rights can contribute to 
overall human rights. In these cases the state needs to act, but local organizations 
are also needed, not only for the allocation of the rights but also for the ongoing 
management of the resources when they are held in common. For this to be 
successful, recognition of land rights must be accompanied by recognition of the 
communal or indigenous groups’ rights to decision-making. This is essentially a 
form of political decentralization of decision-making. 
Social Cohesion, Tenure Security, and Livelihoods 
Whether the outcome of each of these types of reform will contribute to the UNDP 
pillars of democratic governance will depend on both the central government and 
local social institutions and structures. Responsive state institutions for undertaking 
registration, redistribution, restitution or recognition of land rights certainly depend 
on the orientation of the government, but a civil society can also contribute by 
demanding fair and transparent land tenure policies and implementation. Inclusive 
citizen’s participation in the land tenure reform process is more likely in relatively 
homogeneous societies, and is greatly restricted by highly inegalitarian social 
structures. But here the onus is not all on the community institutions. Participation 
is facilitated by the structures that the state provides and its receptivity to work 
with communities, such as recognizing their management rights over resources in 
recognition programs, or their knowledge of local land issues in the other types of 
reforms. Inclusive participation is fostered by the state’s insistence on the inclusion 
of women, minority ethnic groups, and other marginalized communities (e.g. 
pastoralists, forest dwellers) in the decision-making processes. This also applies to 
social cohesion: because land is such a critical resource, land policy will be 
contentious. And as we have seen, communities should not be assumed to be 
homogeneous in their assets or interests, especially when it comes to land. Good 
local social capital and leadership are certainly critical for preventing this from 
creating greater conflict, but the extent to which reforms strengthen or undermine 
community cohesion will also depend on how the state approaches the reforms, 
e.g. whether it engages with communities to build legitimacy for the approaches. 
The extent of rights-based action and gender equity will depend on the extent to 
which the state and community espouse these values. 
Based on this diagnosis of the critical institutions, interventions can be 
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